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LEARNED PROFESSIONS AND JEWS IN MODERN GERMANY AND THEIR
HERITAGE FOR ISRAEL
Charles E. McClelland
[Lecture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, later published
as "Professional Practices Transmitted – German Heritage and the Israeli Social Fabric," in
Dan Diner and Moshe Zimmermann (eds.), Disseminating German Tradition: The Thyssen
Lectures (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2009), 145-63.

The study of professions has become a preoccupation of many
modern historians in recent years. This new interest comes
partly in response to new questions raised by the "new social
history," partly in attempts to investigate the phenomenon in
geographical areas (such as central Europe) where it was
traditionally neglected, and partly in recognition of the claim
made by such prominent social scientists as Talcott Parsons
"that the professional complex ... has already become the most
important
single
component
in
the
structure
of
modern
societies." One may quarrel with Parson's view that "the massive
emergence of the professional complex, not the special status of
capitalistic or socialistic modes of organization, is the
crucial structural development in twentieth-century society."i In
face of a post-industrial "information revolution", however, the
creation, management and role of "expert knowledge" as well as
the self-understanding and ethos of the bearers of that
knowledge is of more vital interest than ever. And although not
all experts are "professionals" (some might add, not all
professionals are experts!), the academic professions in their
modern form offer us one of the best approaches to understanding
the development of certain kinds of expert knowledge and its
application over a longer time-frame.
Theories and history of knowledge have undergone their own
complex development over time. From at least the age of the
Protestant Reformation in Europe, "profession" in Europe has
been associated with a strong ethical imperative, somewhat
analogous to the religious "calling" with which the German word
for occupation, Beruf, is affiliated. Knowledge is power, and
the accumulation
especially of esoteric or existential (lifeand-death) knowledge has usually required both sociallysanctioned acculturation and a "professional ethic" to militate
against abuse of "expert power". The traditional learned
professions -- priestly, legal and medical -- still bear at

least nominal signs of a special ethical code. Indeed earlier
reflections on the nature and evolution of professions dwelled
on the self-regulating activity of professional groups as an
"essential characteristic", so much so that it was widely
assumed that such professions are exclusively a feature of
modern free-market societies (such as England and the USA).ii
A more recent analytical vogue sees professions and their
characteristic organizations as comparable to other lobbies in
pluralistic societies or even as aggressive powers bent on
monopolization of the market in their services, more concerned
with the maximization of their collective income, prestige, and
immunity from ethical control than altruistic goals. In this
view,
professional
groups
not
only
can
coexist
with
bureaucratization,
they
can
under
favorable
circumstances
harness
the
power
of
the
state
to
affect
their
iii
"professionalization project."
In this view, modern learned
professions are not limited to the so-called "free" or "liberal"
ones (i.e. those using a fee-for-service model) but also can
include graduate chemists and engineers who work for large
corporations, teachers who work for the state, and many other
"new professionals."
The German experience of professionalization, entailing the
creation of some new and the transformation of some traditional
learned occupations, took place under a mixture or free-market
and bureaucratized conditions and thus has, in my view, a more
universal validity for comparison with other cases (including
Israel's)
than
the
narrow
Anglo-American
ones.
Modern
professions arose in German-speaking Central Europe over a
fairly short period of time, concentrated in the era of national
unification and Empire, reaching a kind of fitful maturity in
the difficult years of the Weimar Republic, and facing a crisis
coincident with the Hitler Era, from which they have recovered
in altered form in the last half-century. I will focus
particularly on the Imperial and Weimar eras not only because of
their
crucial
formative
importance
for
German
learned
professions, but also because of the very significant, if uneven
involvement of Jews in the process. This involvement had many
important consequences, and I shall attempt to address these
also at the end of this lecture.

BEFORE MODERNIZATION
Professions have been present throughout recorded history,

but the term is not an easy one for historians to use. The older
meaning of profession in German as in French describes a trade,
usually a skilled one, for which apprenticeship normally
provided
preparation.
Beyond
that,
some
professions
traditionally required some level of "university" training. In
Europe from the late Middle Ages the need to master and even
interpret classical texts of law, medicine and religion created
a link with, if not yet a prerequisite for, the practice of
those three professions and, in a broader sense, administration,
teaching, and science. Despite efforts by church and state
authorities
to
require
certifiable
competency
from
ecclesiastical and bureaucratic office-holders, which became
ever more insistent in the eighteenth century, professions in
the early-modern era lacked the symmetrical features they would
acquire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Universitygraduated professional men had no monopoly on the "practice" of
caring for souls, bodies, and legal relationships. Nor did
"learned expertise" have a monopoly on the activities of
professional
men,
who
lacked
one
of
the
characteristic
experiences of their modern brethren, the prospect of a lifelong career in their chosen discipline. Clergymen often began
their careers as teachers, waiting for a parish or other office;
university professors often had to double as firewood or beerand-wine merchants, and rarely remained in the same discipline
they started in; physicians and lawyers were also often
distracted by secondary occupations. Economic rewards were low,
preparing for professions was expensive, success had as much to
do with good fortune and patronage as skill or merit, and public
honor and esteem were notably low.
In the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, however,
learned professions began to acquire some of the characteristics
that mark them off as "modern": continuous and practically
exclusive work in the service sector, based on extensive,
specialized tertiary education and the demonstration of adequate
cognitive knowledge by an examination and licensing process.iv
Reformed universities, infused with an ethos of Wissenschaft and
a mission to discover new knowledge, attracted a larger student
body, which in turn had to face more systematic examination and
licensing requirements demanded by the state. Carried out in
large part at the initiative of the German states' civil service
(arguably
the
first
important
occupational
group
to
be
professionalized in Central Europe), this "professionalization
from above" (H. Siegrist) provided the necessary framework for a
more autonomous, self-conscious kind of professional activity
beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century.

In this phase of "professionalization from above," Jews
were not yet allowed to play a significant role shaping the
modernization of academic professions; but the same can also be
said of the existing Christian members of those professions.
While "emancipation" measures before and during the Napoleonic
era meant that Jews could begin to study in university faculties
other than medicine, their numbers remained small and their
career chances very limited either by law or by administrative
manipulation. University-educated Jews were generally excluded
from the civil service, Gymnasium and university teaching, the
officer corps, the Christian clergy (obviously), as well as
large state-controlled sectors of the medical and legal
professions.v The German states during the reactionary "preMarch", i.e. pre-1848 era frowned upon efforts by professional
men to form local, regional and (especially frightening)
national congresses and organizations, and largely ignored
mounting
demands
for
reform
from
such
professional
organizations, which burst forth in a number of national
professional congresses in the revolutionary period 1848-9. Even
in the following decade of renewed reaction, however, the genie
could not be put back in the bottle, and professional men
(notably working in fields of the private sector, such as
engineering and chemistry, over which the bureaucracy had no
control) began to found national organizations such as the VDI
and DCV. Ultimately the changed political landscape of the North
German Confederation and the German Reich would free many
professions from the heavy hand of government regulation so
common in the pre-March era.
IN THE GERMAN REICH
The concession of equal citizenship rights to religious
minorities by the new German state in 1869 coincided with the
liberalization of laws and attitudes toward professions. The
Reichsgewerbeordnung (also 1869) declared medicine to be a
"free" profession (as demanded by the influential liberal Berlin
Medical Society). An overhaul of the national legal system
beginning in the 1870s produced a Reichsanwaltsordnung (1878)
that effectively privatized the occupation of attorney. The
teaching profession -- or to be more exact the various branches
of it -- also witnessed great expansion, as enrollments
increased dramatically at every level. But education (along with
religion) was still a matter for the member states of the Reich
and remained fissured by the different socioeconomic realities
of its clienteles (i.e. students at different levels and their
parents), by confessional differences, gender issues, and
pedagogical presuppositions reflecting the wide variety of

Weltanschauungen in the new Germany. Such "new" academic
professions as engineering and chemistry received a boost from
the
expansion
of
natural
science
both
in
traditional
universities
and
the
burgeoning
technische
Hochschulen
(polytechnics), which were recognized as equal to universities
in 1900. Partly as symbol of their determination not to
surrender
their
jealously
guarded
cultural
and
artistic
sovereignties, the states of the new German Reich poured
unprecedented
resources
into
their
universities,
research
institutes, as well as art education and patronage.
Despite the official recognition of equal citizenship
rights for Jews, however, unofficial discrimination against them
persisted in most of the professions. Jews could freely study,
obtain the highest degrees, and go through the process of
qualification for all professions. But they were not welcome in
the higher civil service, the officer corps, or virtually any of
the highest levels of any profession requiring appointment to a
state-connected office. Even as some distinguished Jews were
knighted by grateful governments, even the most distinguished
Jewish academics discovered a "glass ceiling" in universities:
unbaptized Jews could be associate professors forever, but not
usually Ordinarien (full professors). They could sit as judges
on the lower benches of the court system, but not the highest.
They could be consulted and listened to on the highest
government levels, but not become "ministers of state." Although
Catholics in Protestant states, Protestants in Catholic states,
politically
left-liberal
personalities,
democrats,
and
socialists, and of course all women suffered similar overt
prejudices, a few of these could begin to find a foothold
somewhere in the German Reich before 1914, or at least earn a
place in German historical mythology for the eclat their
challenges made. German Jews, eager to accept the signs of
acceptance-for-acculturation in the nervous and insecure world
of "modern German culture", understandably pinned their hopes on
what Max Weber somewhat bitterly but probably correctly called
the "rationalization" and Entzauberung of contemporary life.
In the meantime, openings for academically-trained Jews in
Imperial Germany appeared most promising in the professions
least staatsnah, least close to the state. It is also useful to
recall the fact that what historians call "Germany" was then
undergoing one of the most drastic demographic shifts in its
history. Not only German Jews, but most Germans, including such
"new Germans" as Poles, joined the migration from country to
city, from village to industry, from agriculture to urban
culture by about 1900.vi
German Jews not only took the chance to become, more than
ever, urban Bildungsbürger by attending and getting degrees from

German universities, they confidently entered the non-state
professions open to them. It is well-known that they did this in
a few urban settings in a particularly noticeable way, such as
Berlin. What is less well appreciated is that in academic
professional fields open to them, such as law and medicine, and
in the professional organizations that were reaching maturity in
the late German Empire, they began to gain acceptance as
ebenbürtig and to be accorded high voice and office in the
common struggle to establish "professional standards", or in the
terms of 1900, die Hebung des Standes. German Jews were
perceived as being on the cutting edge of excellence and high
standards,
and
made
excellent
allies
for
the
(largely
Protestant) elite of professional organizations working toward
the same goals. It is significant that Jewish doctors and
attorneys were locally confined in their practice to several
German cities, but the national organizations of doctors and
lawyers in Germany sought more than a token representation of
Jews in the higher levels of their councils. For somebody like
me, who has probably sacrificed my vision in advance of the joys
of reading in my old age just to scan several decades of the
Ärztliches Vereinsblatt and the Juristische Wochenschrift, it is
remarkable that professional deference and courtesy, not
antisemitic outbursts, grace these millions of pages. Nobody
seemed to take much notice if the authors were Jewish or of some
other background. The shared ground was the common ethos of
introducing science and reasoned discourse into public life. As
well as the increasingly obvious demand for the "raising of the
profession" in terms of economic rewards, recognition of
expertise in public and private decision-making, and taking the
word Bildung seriously.
One measure of both the assimilation of Jews into the
professions and their influential role in them may be taken from
the legal field. On the eve of World War I, a majority of
attorneys in Berlin, as well over one-fourth of the Prussian
bar, came from Jewish backgrounds. Nationally, Jews (who never
exceeded one percent of the Reich's citizens) constituted about
fifteen percent of all attorneys.vii By contrast, estimates of the
number of barristers of Jewish descent in Britain indicate a
minuscule proportion of the entire profession by 1900. Even in
the 1980s, active barristers made up around 8% of the national
total; if one also includes solicitors (since German attorneys
fulfilled both roles), the proportion increases only to about
12%.viii Figures for France are more difficult to obtain, but in a
society with a relatively small Jewish population and official
emancipation, no more than 10 percent of Paris' 25,000 Jews were
in the liberal professions in 1861, chiefly in medicine, law and
engineering.ix

Some recent studies also indicate the likelihood that Jews
constituted a larger percentage of attorneys at higher courts
than at the less lucrative lower ones, and that their gains may
have come at the expense in some cases of lawyers of Catholic
background.x Similarly, the highest levels of the German Bar
Association (Deutscher Anwaltverein, or DAV) were graced by
prominent Jewish attorneys elected by their largely non-Jewish
peers.xi
The success of Jews in the legal profession produced, in
addition to the accompanying background tones of anti-Semitism
in
broader
German
society,
even
complaints
within
the
profession, often coded in such words as "the commercialization
of the bar". Yet over one significant issue, the DAV (to which
three-quarters of all attorneys belonged by World War I)
consistently refused to yield: it would not advocate the
reintroduction of a numerus clausus or numerical limit on
practicing attorneys to stem rising competition. While it would
be misleading simply to equate advocates of numerus clausus with
antisemitic attitudes, the continuation of open access (freie
Advokatur) had traditionally been associated with its liberal
origins and Jewish success in the profession. The successful
resistance
of
the
(generally
older,
better-established)
leadership of the DAV to the growing complaints (often from
younger, less-well established, and Gentile attorneys) attests
to the symbiotic relationship of German Jews with the lawyer
level of the legal profession.
Discrimination against Jews (and not only Jews) continued
throughout the Empire on the bench and in state prosecutors'
offices, the qualifications for which were the same as for
lawyers, but for which government approval was required.
Although Prussia counted about a hundred Jewish judges around
1880 and 200 forty years later, almost none in higher courts,
the percentage of all judges, in stark contrast to lawyers,
never topped four per cent.xii It must also be added that German
judges
were
much
slower
to
achieve
professional
selfconsciousness than the lawyers: only in 1909 did they succeed in
founding the Deutscher Richterverein (Judges' Association),
since before 1908's Reichsvereinsgesetz governments had still
regarded professional associations of state employees as
subversive.xiii
A similar pattern of high Jewish entry and success in
"free" academic professions can be discerned in medicine, as
elsewhere in central and western Europe. By 1907 about six
percent of physicians and dentists in Germany were Jewish. It
should also be born in mind that this proportion would likely
have been closer to that in the legal profession (about 14%
nationally the same year)xiv had not the medical profession as a

whole expanded in the early phase of the new German Reich much
more rapidly than the legal profession. The number of physicians
per 100,000 population had fluctuated between 30 and 35 from the
1848 Revolution until 1887, but had reached 40 in 1892 and 50 in
1900, where it stabilized until after World War I.xv By way of
contrast, after rising only very slowly in the first three
decades of the Reich, the number of lawyers lept from 13:100,000
to 19:100,000 only between 1900 and 1913.xvi
By the last decade of the German Empire Jews also
constituted a high percentage of some other "private sector"
professions that had come increasingly to be associated with
university-level
education:
private
scholar,
author,
and
xvii
journalist (at about eight percent).
This corresponds roughly
to the percentage of Jews among higher school pupils (6-8%) and
university students (7-8%). At the same time, careers as
teachers in elementary, secondary and higher education remained
severely limited. STATS ??
IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC
As Peter Pulzer recently summed up the German Empire, it
"was a land of opportunity, not least for its Jews. ...But it
was a land of unequal opportunity, with most branches of the
public services ... virtually barred to the unbaptized Jew."xviii
The end of the Obrigkeitsstaat of 1871 meant the end of
unofficial and unconstitutional discrimination against religious
minorities (for that is what it had traditionally been). The
Weimar Republic, while still not de facto a land of equal
opportunity, operated under a constitution drafted by a Jewish
lawyer (Hugo Preuß). But party-political factionalism, weak and
unstable coalition governments, and recurring economic crises
did
not
provide
the
fertile
ground
for
achieving
the
"professionalizing project" that many professionals had hoped
for. Unprecedented waves of higher-education graduates flooded
the market for professional services, exacerbating generationgap resentments.xix
Structural changes in both the economy and
the education system also meant that increasing numbers of
academic professionals were coming from a background in science
and engineering, while members of occupational groups such as
elementary schoolteachers agitated for the university-level
educational requirements that would secure their claim to full
professional
status.
In
this
climate
the
professional
organizations of the Wilhelmian Bildungsbürgertum appeared to
many to be outworn and insufficiently radical gentlemen's clubs
of Honoratioren. Already before World War I, labor-union tactics
had been invoked, by of all groups, the German Medical
Association in successful strikes during disputes with medical

insurance funds. Under the Weimar Republic, which was friendlier
to labor unions than the Empire had been, the "professional
union" made its first appearance, about which more later.
The success of Jews in the "private sector" professions
increased under the Weimar Republic in many ways. The percentage
of Jewish private-practice physicians has been estimated to have
reached nearly 16% of the Prussian total by 1925; nearly 15% of
the dentists; and about 6% of the pharmacists. (Except for
physicians, the percentages in public health offices was
considerably lower.)xx
Jews comprised nearly 29% of Prussia's lawyers (and about half
of Berlin's) by 1933.xxi In the DAV, eleven of 25 members of the
executive committee were Jews.xxii Such figures are relativized a
little by the Reich's disproportional loss of Gentile population
as a result of the Versailles Treaty, but also by the decline of
the Jewish population in ratio to the overall population even
before the beginnings of emigration in 1933.
The picture in public-sector professions appears more
complicated. Although opportunities for Jews on the bench and in
the public prosecutors' offices opened noticeably in the first
years of the Republic, improvement toward its end did not
continue, as one might logically expect from a combination of
openings, more than enough qualified Jewish graduates, and an
officially more accepting attitude. Logic, however, had little
to do with reality. Entering the judicial or administrative
branches of government still required a legal education equal to
that of attorneys. But it also required -- as had been the case
under and even before the German Empire -- an extremely long and
wretchedly remunerated "waiting period" as Referendar and
Assessor -- before any chance of being raised into the security
of permanent Beamter status. This period was so long that very
few Jewish law graduates entering the "waiting line" would have
had a chance, even under the improved access of the Republic, to
qualify for permanent civil service appointments before the
onset on the Great Depression and its accompanying reduction-inforce policies.
Political fissures in the Republic, as well as its
professional organizations, may have played as significant role
as overt anti-Semitism in explaining the declining numbers of an
already-low percentage of Jews in the higher civil service and
bench. Ironically, one of the few (and of course baptized) Jews
to reach high office in the last days of the Empire, Curt Joel,
as Brüning's State Secretary in the Ministry of Justice, pursued
a ban on appointment to judicial posts of members of the
Republikanischer Richterbund, which not only held politically
leftist
leanings,
but
many
Jewish
members.xxiii
Both
the

conservative Deutscher Juristenbund (founded 1919) and the
liberal DAV managed to protest together an early Prussian
government proposal to open judgeships to any citizen even
lacking academic legal training who could pass state juridical
examinations
as
an
unacceptable
"Americanization"
and
democratization.xxiv And women, irrespective of their background,
suffered even greater overt discrimination in the civil-service
and judicial branches despite their legal equality after 1918.xxv
The fate of Jewish teachers at all levels, including the
highest, was similarly checkered under the Weimar Republic.
While 6.9% of full professors in Germany were estimated to be of
Jewish descent in 1909 (presumably almost all baptized), the
figure had fallen slightly to 5.6% in 1931.xxvi Jews comprised a
higher
percentage
of
the
Privatdozenten,
the
unsalaried
lecturers from which most full professors were later recruited - about 10% in 1909 -- and of "extraordinary" professors (7%),
but the tendency of the proportion from then onwards was
downward.xxvii
The
number
of
Jewish
secondary
and
primary
schoolteachers (except for Jewish schools) had always been kept
minuscule by the religious-confessional principle of German
schooling -- among over 200,000 elementary and secondary
teachers in Germany by 1933, only 1,200 were Jewish, half of
those in Jewish schools.xxviii
Teachers belonged to one of the "new professions" in the
sense that it became an academic occupation later than such
traditional ones as medicine and law. There were others worth
mentioning briefly, in which German Jews played more or less
significant roles. Dentistry, as already mentioned in connection
with medicine, was a "new profession" in which Jews played a
significant role. On the other hand, German Jews appear not to
have been attracted strongly to engineering. By 1933, there were
barely 1,400 Jewish engineers in Germany, about half of one
percent of the total.xxix Jews however played a very significant
role
in
occupations
that
were
only
beginning
to
be
professionalized in this period -- the creative and performing
arts.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, one of the
new trends in professional organizational life during the Weimar
period was the rise of unions. The typical development included
professionals other than just academically-trained and/or had a
social and political orientation more toward the left. This
trend is worth noting here because Jewish professionals were
prominently
represented
in
some
of
them,
such
as
the
Republikanischer Richterbund already mentioned. Nearly seven
percent of Prussia's chemists in 1925 were Jewishxxx, and it would
not be surprising to find many disgruntled younger employed
technicians joining the League of Technical Employees and

Officials (BUTAB) closely tied to the socialist Allgemeiner
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund.
The ultimate crisis of the Weimar Republic coincided with a
crisis for the professions, with a horrendous upwardly-spiraling
surplus of professionals being trained by a higher education
system unwilling to impose limits on Lernfreiheit and, thanks to
the Great Depression, a downwardly spiraling market for
professional services. One contemporary study estimated that
there were altogether about a third of a million positions for
academic professionals in Germany in 1932, and that at current
rates of production there would soon be one million qualified
candidates for them.xxxi Sentiments for reducing competition could
also, in a most virulent form, be twisted into calls for
reduction or removal of groups from university admission who
were allegedly "disproportionately" represented (meaning Jews)
or whose social "place" was elsewhere (meaning women). Although
the NSDAP made some of its earliest inroads in the late 1920s at
universities,
even
taking
over
the
national
student
organization,
Nazi
followers
had
little
luck
subverting
professional organizations before 1933 -- one reason they were
forced to go forth and found their own.xxxii
LEGACIES FOR TODAY
The brutal National Socialist road to the Holocaust began
at the doorstep of German professions. The expulsion of Jews
from universities, the civil service and virtually all "public"
professional occupations was already a first Nazi priority in
the spring of 1933. The forced resignations of Jews from
prominent office in the "free" professional organizations took a
little longer, and the virtual elimination of Jews from
practicing their profession a bit longer still. There are
indications that the Nazi promise of "reprofessionalization,"
which in practice meant decreasing competition and increasing
the economic security of many so-called "Aryan" professionals
and conceding long-standing demands by some professional groups
(e.g. for a national Lawyers' Chamber and Code, and a
Physicians' Code, in the mid-1930s or a numerus clausus on
admissions), was fulfilled in some ways, at first. But the
Nazification of all professional life effectively nullified any
gains, and already before the outbreak of World War II one could
say
that
the
effect
of
Nazism
was
to
promote
xxxiii
"deprofessionalization".
The organized mayhem and destruction wrought by the "Third
Reich"
left
German
professions
in
shambles.
Under
the
"restaurationist" policies of Adenauer in the Federal Republic,
they often reverted to their Weimar models, but with a much

higher degree of realization of their "professionalizing
projects" thanks in large part to political stability (i.e.,
having a stable government to "lobby") and economic prosperity.
At the same time, many professional groups drew the lesson from
history that a labor-union model was the best guarantee of
professional advancement, as with schoolteachers organized in
the GEW (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft).
It is hardly necessary here to do more than mention the
massive loss to Germany that the emigration of probably the
majority of its Jewish professionals and the subsequent murder
of the rest.xxxiv It may be equally unnecessary to recall that so
many countries, including Israel and my own, experienced a great
enrichment of their professional, scholarly and cultural life as
a result of this emigration.xxxv
On the other hand, there is not much evidence of GermanJewish émigrés bringing the forms of professional life they had
helped develop in Germany to their new home countries, where the
development of professions had in any case already taken on
indigenous shapes. This was not so firmly the case in Palestine
before the founding of the State of Israel. Indeed, in the view
of Peter Medding, "The pioneering ethos of the country's major
political movement was based upon a revolt against such
/professional/
occupations
as
being
unnecessary
and
xxxvi
unproductive...."
A modern state, however, soon needed the
skills of professionals, and they in turn made claims consistent
with the "professionalization project" internationally -- for
respect, recognition, special income and security status -- and
were in some cases, like some German professions we have
discussed, willing to use or at least threaten strike action to
achieve them. The somewhat uneasy relationship of professionals
and the Histadrut since the mid-1950s and developments since
have produced a situation comparable in some ways to that of the
postwar Federal Republic of Germany: professionals are to be
found
grouped
in
"unions,
associations
that
are
both
'professional' and unionized, and organizations focusing solely
on professional issues."xxxvii As in Germany, teachers are
unionized, but physicians have their own independent medical
association. Engineers in Israel have both a relatively
autonomous Engineers Federation within the Histadrut and an
Engineers
Bureau
outside
it,
whose
existence
gives
the
Federation considerable leverage. Although there is also a
Lawyers Federation in the Histadrut, most Israeli lawyers belong
to the independent Bar Association, which has many parallels
with the German equivalent.xxxviii
This is not to say that the shape of Israeli professional
life can be traced directly back to influences brought to bear
by German émigrés, although it would be most interesting to

track it. More importantly than direct, personal influences
would be the loosely shared experience of professionalization
models throughout Central and Eastern Europe before migration to
Eretz Yisrael. While it would be incorrect to speak of a "German
model" adopted by neighboring societies to the east, the German
experience of professionalization (as well as the similar
Austro-Hungarian one) clearly left its mark on, for example,
interwar Czechoslovakia and Poland more than did the British or
American experience. Thus studying the heritage of professional
life for Israel would have to encompass both similarities and
dissimilarities experienced in professional life among several
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, not just Germany.xxxix And
needless to emphasize, such a study would also have to recognize
manifold other influences, such as the evolving nature of
Israeli society, education, economic structures, and influences
from other modern professional cultures (such as Britain).
What we can clearly distinguish, however, is the fact that
Germany was not only the country that most systematically and
ruthlessly removed Jews from its professional life sixty and
more years ago, but also the country that opened the largest
scope for professional activities by Jews in modern history up
to
that
time.
The
processes
of
professionalization
and
assimilation were roughly synchronous for German Jews, not
accidentally but integrally so. For the professionalization
process entailed most of the same values as were necessary for
assimilation, values we identify as "liberal," rationalist,
meritocratic, homogenizing, civic and urbane. Just as German
Jews played a role in the modern professionalizing process
incomparably larger than in nearby countries, the "professional
crisis" of the late Weimar era heralded a crisis for German
Jews, just as Hitler's promises to "re-professionalize" academic
occupations were made at the expense Jews.
The German experience of professionalization, led initially
and always accompanied by a state sector, later balancing
between public and private sectors of professional activity,
gave Jews significant opportunity in certain modern occupational
roles. The German Empire (as elsewhere in the world) at the same
time unofficially discriminated against Jews refusing to abandon
their religious confession by limiting advancement in such
public areas as the high civil service, courts, armed forces,
and teaching. While the Weimar Republic offered excellent
prospects for improvement, it was also unable to master the
economic and social problems that increasingly shook the world
of professionals and caused increasing resentment of oppressive
competition
from
what
one
might
call
"non-traditional"
practitioners, whether Jews, women, or children of the working
class. The crisis of German professional life was thus

especially fateful for German Jews, who not only suffered with
their fellow-professionals but were made the scapegoat by Nazi
propaganda. When German professional life had to be rebuilt,
slowly
and
with
difficulty,
in
the
wake
of
Hitler's
thoroughgoing "deprofessionalization," one of the hardest tasks
was to reconnect with the fundamental values of modern
professional activity without the emigrated and murdered German
Jews who had been so instrumental in sustaining those values.
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